Abstract. Edwards recently introduced a new normal form for elliptic curves. Every elliptic curve over a non-binary field is birationally equivalent to a curve in Edwards form over an extension of the field, and in many cases over the original field. This paper presents fast explicit formulas (and register allocations) for group operations on an Edwards curve. The algorithm for doubling uses only 3M + 4S, i.e., 3 field multiplications and 4 field squarings. If curve parameters are chosen to be small then the algorithm for mixed addition uses only 9M + 1S and the algorithm for non-mixed addition uses only 10M + 1S. Arbitrary Edwards curves can be handled at the cost of just one extra multiplication by a curve parameter.
Introduction
The core operations in elliptic-curve cryptography are single-scalar multiplication (m, P → mP ), double-scalar multiplication (m, n, P, Q → mP + nQ), etc. Miller, in his Crypto '85 paper introducing elliptic-curve cryptography, proposed carrying out these operations on points represented in Jacobian form: "Each point is represented by the triple (x, y, z) which corresponds to the point (x/z 2 , y/z 3 )" on a curve y 2 = x 3 + a 4 x + a 6 . See [37, page 424] . One can add two points using 16 field multiplications, specifically 11M + 5S, with the fastest algorithms known today; here we keep separate tallies of squarings S and general multiplications M. A mixed addition -this means that one input has z = 1 -takes only 7M + 4S. A doubling takes 1M + 8S + 1D, where D denotes the cost of multiplying by a 4 ; a doubling takes 3M + 5S in the special case a 4 = −3.
Several subsequent papers analyzed the performance of other forms of elliptic curves proposed in the mathematical literature. See, e.g., [18] for the speed of several dialects of the Weierstrass form, [34] for the speed of Jacobi intersections, [28] for the speed of Hessians, and [9] for the speed of Jacobi quartics; see also [38] and [23] , which introduced the Montgomery and Doche/Icart/Kohel forms and analyzed their speed. These alternate forms attracted some interest -in particular, many of them simplify protection against side-channel attacks, and the speed records in [7] for single-scalar multiplication were set with the Montgomery form -but the Jacobian form remained the overall speed leader for multi-scalar multiplication.
A new form for elliptic curves was added to the mathematical literature a few months ago: Edwards showed in [25] that all elliptic curves over number fields could be transformed to the shape x 2 + y 2 = c 2 (1 + x 2 y 2 ), with (0, c) as neutral element and with the surprisingly simple and symmetric addition law (x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 ) → x 1 y 2 + y 1 x 2 c(1 + x 1 x 2 y 1 y 2 ) , y 1 y 2 − x 1 x 2 c(1 − x 1 x 2 y 1 y 2 )
.
Similarly, all elliptic curves over non-binary finite fields can be transformed to Edwards form. Some elliptic curves require a field extension for the transformation, but some elliptic curves have transformations defined over the original number field or finite field.
To capture a larger class of elliptic curves over the original field, we expand the notion of Edwards form to include all curves x 2 + y 2 = c 2 (1 + dx 2 y 2 ) where cd(1 − dc 4 ) = 0. More than 1/4 of all isomorphism classes of elliptic curves over a finite field -for example, the curve "Curve25519" previously used to set speed records for single-scalar multiplication -can be transformed to Edwards curves over the same field. See §2 and §3 of this paper for further background on Edwards curves.
Our main goal in this paper is to analyze the impact of Edwards curves upon cryptographic applications. Our main conclusions are that the Edwards form (1) breaks solidly through the Jacobian speed barrier, (2) is competitive with the Montgomery form for single-scalar multiplication, and (3) is the new speed leader for multi-scalar multiplication. Specifically, we present explicit formulas (i.e., sequences of additions, subtractions, and multiplications) that
• compute an addition (X 1 :
Y 2 : Z 2 ) using 10M + 1S + 1D -here D is the cost of multiplying by a selectable curve parameter; • compute a mixed addition (X 1 : Y 1 : Z 1 ), (X 2 : Y 2 : 1) → (X 1 : Y 1 :
Z 1 ) + (X 2 : Y 2 : 1) using 9M + 1S + 1D; and • compute a doubling (X 1 : Y 1 : Z 1 ) → 2(X 1 : Y 1 : Z 1 ) using 3M + 4S.
See §4 for details of these computations; §5 for a comparison of these speeds to the speeds of explicit formulas for Jacobian, Hessian, etc.; §6 and §7 for an analysis of the resulting speeds of single-scalar multiplication and general multiscalar multiplication; and §8 for a discussion of side-channel attacks.
An Edwards curve with a unique point of order 2 has the extra feature that the addition formulas are complete. This means that the formulas work for all pairs of input points on the curve, with no exceptions for doubling, no exceptions for the neutral element, no exceptions for negatives, etc. Some previous addition formulas have been advertised as unified formulas that can handle generic doublings, simplifying protection against side-channel attacks; our addition formulas are faster than previous unified formulas and have the stronger property of completeness. See §3, §5, and §8 for further discussion.
Transformation to Edwards form
Fix a field k of characteristic different from 2. Let E be an elliptic curve over k having a point of order 4. This section shows that some quadratic twist of E is birationally equivalent over k to an Edwards curve: specifically, a curve of the form x 2 + y 2 = 1 + dx 2 y 2 with d / ∈ {0, 1}. (Perhaps this twist is E itself; perhaps not.) §3 shows that the Edwards addition law on the Edwards curve corresponds to the standard elliptic-curve addition law.
If E has a unique point of order 2 then some quadratic twist of E is birationally equivalent over k to an Edwards curve having non-square d. If k is finite and E has a unique point of order 2 then the twist can be removed: E is birationally equivalent over k to an Edwards curve having non-square d. §3 shows that the Edwards addition law is complete in this case.
All of these equivalences can be computed efficiently. The proof of Theorem 2.1 explicitly constructs d given a Weierstrass-form elliptic curve, and explicitly maps points between the Weierstrass curve and the Edwards curve.
As an example, consider the elliptic curve published in [7] for fast scalar multiplication in Montgomery form, namely the elliptic curve v 2 = u 3 +486662u 2 +u modulo p = 2 255 − 19. This curve "Curve25519" is birationally equivalent over Z/p to the Edwards curve x 2 + y 2 = 1 + (121665/121666)x 2 y 2 . The transformation is easy: simply define x = √ 486664u/v and y = (u − 1)/(u + 1); note that 486664 is a square modulo p. The inverse transformation is just as easy: simply define u = (1 + y)/(1 − y) and v = √ 486664u/x. Every Edwards curve has a point of order 4; see §3. So it is natural to consider elliptic curves having points of order 4. What about elliptic curves that do not have points of order 4 -for example, the NIST curves over prime fields? Construct an extension field k of k such that E(k ), the group of points of E defined over k , has an element of order 4. Then replace k by k in Theorem 2.1 to see that some twist of E is birationally equivalent over k to an Edwards curve defined over k . Theorem 2.1. Let k be a field in which 2 = 0. Let E be an elliptic curve over k such that the group E(k) has an element of order 4. Then (1) there exists d ∈ k − {0, 1} such that the curve x 2 + y 2 = 1 + dx 2 y 2 is birationally equivalent over k to a quadratic twist of E; (2) if E(k) has a unique element of order 2 then there is a nonsquare d ∈ k such that the curve x 2 + y 2 = 1 + dx 2 y 2 is birationally equivalent over k to a quadratic twist of E; and (3) if k is finite and E(k) has a unique element of order 2 then there is a nonsquare d ∈ k such that the curve x 2 +y 2 = 1+dx 2 y 2 is birationally equivalent over k to E.
Proof. Write E in long Weierstrass form s 2 + a 1 rs + a 3 s = r 3 + a 2 r 2 + a 4 r + a 6 . Assume without loss of generality that a 1 = 0 and a 3 = 0; to handle the general case, define s = s + (a 1 r + a 3 )/2.
Write P for the hypothesized point of order 4 on E. Assume without loss of generality that 2P = (0, 0) and thus a 6 = 0; to handle the general case, define r = r − r 2 where 2P = (r 2 , s 2 ).
The elliptic curve E now has the form s 2 = r 3 + a 2 r 2 + a 4 r. Write P as (r 1 , s 1 ). The next step is to express a 2 and a 4 in terms of r 1 and s 1 .
Note that s 1 = 0, as otherwise P has order 2. Consequently r 1 = 0. The equation 2P = (0, 0) means that the tangent line to E at P passes through (0, 0), i.e., that s 1 − 0 = (r 1 − 0)λ where λ is the tangent slope (3r 
Note that d = 1 since r 1 = 0. Note also that d = 0: otherwise the right hand side of E's equation would be r 3 + a 2 r 2 + a 4 r = r 3 + 2r 1 r 2 + r 2 1 r = r(r + r 1 ) 2 , contradicting the hypothesis that E is elliptic. Note also that if d is a square then there is another point of order 2 in E(k), namely r 1 (
, 0 . Consider two quadratic twists of E, namely the elliptic curves E and E defined by (r 1 /(1 − d))s 2 = r 3 + a 2 r 2 + a 4 r and (
If k is finite and d is nonsquare then either
Substitute u = r/r 1 and v = s/r 1 to see that E is isomorphic to the elliptic curve ( 
+ u, and therefore to E . The rational map (u, v) → (x, y) is defined by x = 2u/v and y = (u−1)/(u+1); there are only finitely many exceptional points with v(u + 1) = 0. The inverse rational map (x, y) → (u, v) is defined by u = (1 + y)/(1 − y) and v = 2(1 + y)/(1 − y)x; there are only finitely many exceptional points with (1 − y)x = 0. A straightforward calculation, included in [8] , shows that the inverse rational map produces (u, v)
To summarize: (1) The curve x 2 + y 2 = 1 + dx 2 y 2 is equivalent to a quadratic twist E of E. (2) If E has a unique point of order 2 then d is a nonsquare and
If k is finite and E has a unique point of order 2 then d is a nonsquare so E is isomorphic to E or to E ; thus E is birationally equivalent to
Notes on isomorphisms. If d = dc 4 then the curve x 2 + y 2 = 1 + dx 2 y 2 is isomorphic to the curve x 2 +y 2 = c 2 (1+dx 2 y 2 ): simply define x = cx and y = cy. In particular, if k is a finite field, then at least 1/4 of the nonzero elements of k are 4th powers, so d/d is a 4th power for at least 1/4 of the choices of d ∈ k − {0}; the smallest qualifying d is typically extremely small. But for computational purposes we do not recommend minimizing d as a general strategy: a small c is more valuable than a small d. See §4.
The Edwards addition law
This section presents the Edwards addition law for an Edwards curve
. We show (1) that the Edwards addition law produces points on the curve, (2) that the Edwards addition law corresponds to the standard addition law on a birationally equivalent elliptic curve, and (3) that the Edwards addition law is complete when d is not a square. Proofs appear at the end of the section.
Fix a field k of characteristic different from 2. Fix c, d ∈ k such that c = 0, d = 0, and dc 4 = 1. Consider the Edwards addition law
on the Edwards curve
Examples: for each point P = (x 1 , y 1 ) on the curve, P is the sum of (0, c) and P , so (0, c) is a neutral element of the addition law; the only neutral element is (0, c); (0, c) is the sum of P and −P = (−x 1 , y 1 ); in particular, (0, −c) has order 2; (c, 0) and (−c, 0) have order 4.
The next theorem states that the output of the Edwards addition law is on the curve when the output is defined, i.e., when dx 1 x 2 y 1 y 2 / ∈ {−1, 1}. ). Assume that dx 1 x 2 y 1 y 2 / ∈ {−1, 1}. Define
The next theorem states that the output of the Edwards addition law corresponds to the output of the standard addition law on a birationally equivalent elliptic curve E. One can therefore perform group operations on E (or on any other birationally equivalent elliptic curve) by performing the corresponding group operations on the Edwards curve, at the expense of evaluating and inverting the correspondence once for each series of computations.
Theorem 3.2. In the situation of Theorem 3.1, let e = 1 − dc 4 and let E be the elliptic curve (1/e)v 2 = u 3 + (4/e − 2)u 2 + u. For each i ∈ {1, 2, 3} define P i as follows:
Then P i ∈ E(k) and P 1 + P 2 = P 3 .
Here P 1 + P 2 means the sum of P 1 and P 2 in the standard addition law on E(k). Note that x i = 0 implies y i = c.
The group operations could encounter exceptional points where the Edwards addition law is not defined. One can, in many applications, rely on randomization to avoid the exceptional points, or one can switch from the Edwards curve back to E when exceptional points occur.
The next theorem states that, when d is not a square, there are no exceptional points: the denominators in the Edwards addition law cannot be zero. In other words, when d is not a square, the Edwards addition law is complete: it is defined for all pairs of input points on the Edwards curve over k. The set E(k), with the standard addition law, is isomorphic as a group to the set of points (x 1 , y 1 ) ∈ k×k on the Edwards curve, with the Edwards addition law. The Edwards addition law can carry out any sequence of group operations, without risk of failure. ). Then dx 1 x 2 y 1 y 2 = 1 and dx 1 x 2 y 1 y 2 = −1.
Example: d = 121665/121666 is not a square in the field k = Z/(2 255 − 19). The Edwards addition law is defined for all (x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 ) on the Edwards curve x 2 + y 2 = 1 + dx 2 y 2 over k, and corresponds to the standard addition law on "Curve25519," the elliptic curve v 2 = u 3 + 486662u 2 + u over k. The point at ∞ on Curve25519 corresponds to the point (0, 1) on the Edwards curve; the point (0, 0) on Curve25519 corresponds to (0, −1); any other point (u, v) on Curve25519 corresponds to ( √ 486664u/v, (u − 1)/(u + 1)); a sum of points on Curve25519 corresponds to a sum of points on the Edwards curve. One can therefore perform a sequence of group operations on points of the elliptic curve v 2 = u 3 + 486662u 2 + u by performing the same sequence of group operations on the corresponding points of the Edwards curve.
The reader might wonder why [11, Theorem 1] ("The smallest cardinality of a complete system of addition laws on E equals two") does not force exceptional cases in the addition law for the curve
The simplest answer is that [11, Theorem 1] is concerned with exceptional cases in the algebraic closure of k, whereas we are concerned with exceptional cases in k itself.
The reader might also wonder why we ignore the two projective points (0 : 1 : 0) and (1 : 0 : 0) on the Edwards curve. The answer is that, although these points might at first glance appear to be defined over k, they are actually singularities of the curve, and resolving the singularities produces four points that are defined over k(
Proof (of Theorem 3.1). The special case d = 1 is equivalent to [25, Theorem 8.1] . We could deduce the general case from the special case, but to keep this paper self-contained we instead give a direct proof. The first ingredient in the proof is a mechanically verifiable polynomial iden-
The identity says that T = (x 
The third ingredient is the Edwards addition law, i.e., the definition of (x 3 , y 3 ) in terms of x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 . We have
Proof (of Theorem 3.2). First we show that each
by essentially the same calculations as in Theorem 2.1, omitted here. All that remains is to show that P 1 + P 2 = P 3 . There are several cases in the standard addition law for E(k); the proof thus splits into several cases.
If (x 1 , y 1 ) = (0, c) then (x 3 , y 3 ) = (x 2 , y 2 ). Now P 1 is the point at infinity and P 2 = P 3 , so P 1 + P 2 = ∞ + P 2 = P 2 = P 3 . Similar comments apply if (x 2 , y 2 ) = (0, c). Assume from now on that (x 1 , y 1 ) = (0, c) and (x 2 , y 2 ) = (0, c).
2 ) = (0, −c) and P 1 = (0, 0) = P 2 ; otherwise x 1 , x 2 are nonzero so u 1 = (c + y 1 )/(c − y 1 ) = u 2 and v 1 = 2cu 1 /x 1 = −2cu 2 /x 2 = −v 2 so P 1 = −P 2 . In both cases P 1 + P 2 = ∞ = P 3 . Assume from now on that (x 3 , y 3 ) = (0, c).
If (x 1 , y 1 ) = (0, −c) then (x 3 , y 3 ) = (−x 2 , −y 2 ). Now (x 2 , y 2 ) = (0, −c) (since otherwise (x 3 , y 3 ) = (0, c)) and (x 2 , y 2 ) = (0, c) so x 2 = 0. Thus P 1 = (0, 0) and P 2 = (u 2 , v 2 ) with u 2 = (c+y 2 )/(c−y 2 ) and v 2 = 2cu 2 /x 2 . The standard addition law says that (0, 0) + (u 2 , v 2 ) = (r 3 , s 3 ) where
Assume from now on that x 1 = 0 and x 2 = 0. Then P 1 = (u 1 , v 1 ) with u 1 = (c + y 1 )/(c − y 1 ) and v 1 = 2cu 1 /x 1 , and P 2 = (u 2 , v 2 ) with u 2 = (c + y 2 )/(c − y 2 ) and
. Furthermore P 3 = (0, 0) so the standard addition law says as above that
Assume from now on that x 3 = 0. Then
If
, which is already handled above. Assume from now on that P 2 = −P 1 .
If u 2 = u 1 and v 2 = −v 1 then the standard addition law says that (u 1 , v 1 ) + (u 2 , v 2 ) = (r 3 , s 3 ) where λ = (3u 2 1 + 2(4/e − 2)u 1 + 1)/((2/e)v 1 ), r 3 = (1/e)λ 2 − (4/e − 2) − 2u 1 , and s 3 = λ(u 1 − r 3 ) − v 1 . A straightforward calculation, included in [8] , shows that (r 3 , s 3 ) = (u 3 , v 3 ).
The only remaining case is that u 2 = u 1 . The standard addition law says
2 − (4/e−2)−u 1 −u 2 , and s 3 = λ(u 1 −r 3 )−v 1 . Another straightforward calculation, included in [8] , shows that (r 3 , s 3 ) = (u 3 , v 3 ).
Conclusion:
Proof (of Theorem 3.3). Write = dx 1 x 2 y 1 y 2 . Suppose that ∈ {−1, 1}. Then
2 so d is a square, contradiction. If both x 2 + y 2 and x 2 − y 2 are 0 then x 2 = 0 and y 2 = 0, contradiction.
Efficient group operations in Edwards form
This section presents fast explicit formulas and register allocations for doubling, mixed addition, etc. on Edwards curves with arbitrary parameters c, d.
As usual we count the number of operations in the underlying field. We keep separate tallies of the number of general multiplications (each costing M), squarings (each costing S), multiplications by c (each costing C), multiplications by d (each costing D), and additions/subtractions (each costing a). The costs M, S, C, D, a depend on the choice of platform, on the choice of finite field, and on the choice of c and d.
Every Edwards curve can easily be transformed to an isomorphic Edwards curve over the same field having c = 1 and thus C = 0; see "Notes on isomorphisms" in §2. In subsequent sections we assume that c =
Addition. To avoid the inversions in the original Edwards addition formulas, we homogenize the curve equation to (
) and Z 1 = 0 corresponds to the affine point (X 1 /Z 1 , Y 1 /Z 1 ). The neutral element is (0 : c : 1), and the inverse of (X 1 :
The following formulas, given (X 1 :
One readily counts 10M + 1S + 1C + 1D + 7a. We have saved operations here by rewriting x 1 y 2 + x 2 y 1 as (x 1 + y 1 )(x 2 + y 2 ) − x 1 x 2 − y 1 y 2 and by exploiting common subexpressions.
The following specific sequence of operations starts with registers R 1 , R 2 , R 3 containing X 1 , Y 1 , Z 1 and registers R 4 , R 5 , R 6 containing X 2 , Y 2 , Z 2 , uses just two temporary registers R 7 , R 8 and constants c, d, ends with registers R 1 , R 2 , R 3 containing X 3 , Y 3 , Z 3 and untouched registers R 4 , R 5 , R 6 containing X 2 , Y 2 , Z 2 , and uses 10M + 1S + 1C + 1D + 7a:
We emphasize that these formulas work whether or not (X 1 :
. There is no need to go to extra effort to unify the addition formulas with separate doubling formulas; the addition formulas are already unified. If d is not a square then the addition law works for all pairs of input points. See §3 for further discussion of the scope of validity of the addition formulas.
As an alternative, one can obtain A(B −E) and A(B +E) and (B −E)(B +E) as linear combinations of
2 . This change replaces 10M+1S by 7M+5S, presumably saving time on platforms where S/M < 0.75. Note that S/M ≈ 0.67 in [7] .
Mixed addition. "Mixed addition" refers to the case that Z 2 is known to be 1. In this case the multiplication A = Z 1 · Z 2 can be eliminated, reducing the total costs to 9M + 1S + 1C + 1D + 7a.
Doubling. "Doubling" refers to the case that (X 1
The following specific sequence of operations, starting with X 1 , Y 1 , Z 1 in registers R 1 , R 2 , R 3 , changes registers R 1 , R 2 , R 3 to contain X 3 , Y 3 , Z 3 , using 3M + 4S + 3C + 6a and using just two temporary registers R 4 , R 5 :
The following alternate sequence of operations uses one more addition, totalling 3M + 4S + 3C + 7a, but uses just one additional register R 4 :
Another option is to scale (X 3 : Y 3 : Z 3 ) to (X 3 /c : Y 3 /c : Z 3 /c), replacing two multiplications by c with one multiplication by 1/c; typically 1/c can be precomputed. Of course, all three multiplications by c can be skipped if c = 1.
Compression. Given x one can easily recover ±y = (c 2 − x 2 )/(1 − c 2 dx 2 ).
Comparison to previous addition speeds
This section compares the speeds of the algorithms in §4 to the speeds of previous algorithms for elliptic-curve doubling, elliptic-curve mixed addition, etc. The next three sections perform similar comparisons for higher-level elliptic-curve operations relevant to various cryptographic applications.
Level of detail of the comparison. We follow most of the literature in ignoring the costs of additions, subtractions, and multiplications by small constants. We recognize that these costs (and the costs of non-arithmetic operations) can be quite noticeable in practice, and we plan a more detailed cost evaluation of the Edwards form along the lines of [7] , but for this paper we ignore the costs.
Consider, for example, the usual doubling algorithm for Jacobian coordinates in the case a 4 = −3: there are 4 squarings, 4 general multiplications, 5 additions and subtractions, and 5 multiplications by the small constants 2, 3, 4, 8, 8. We summarize these costs as 4M + 4S.
Some algorithms involve multiplications by curve parameters, such as the parameter d in Edwards curves. Some applications can take advantage of multiplying by a constant d, and some applications can choose curves where d is small, but other applications cannot. To cover both situations we separately tally the cost D of multiplying by a curve parameter; the reader can substitute D = 0, D = M, or anything in between.
Each of our tables includes a column "(1, 1)" that substitutes (S, D) ≈ (M, M), a column "(0.8, 0.5)" that substitutes (S, D) ≈ (0.8M, 0.5M), and a column "(0.8, 0)" that substitutes (S, D) ≈ (0.8M, 0M). We sort each table using the standard, but debatable, approximations (S, D) ≈ (0.8M, 0M). We do not claim that these approximations are valid for most applications. The order of entries in our tables can easily be affected by small changes in the S/M ratio, the D/M ratio, etc.
Algorithms in the literature. We have built an "Explicit-Formulas Database" [8] containing, in computer-readable format, various algorithms for operations on elliptic curves. EFD currently consists of 123 scripts for the Magma computeralgebra system checking the correctness of algorithms for elliptic curves in the following forms:
• Projective: A point (x, y) on an elliptic curve y 2 = x 3 + ax + b, with neutral element at infinity, is represented as (X : 
Here (S : C : D : Z) = (λS : λC : λD : λZ) for all nonzero λ.
• Hessian: A point (x, y) on an elliptic curve x 3 + y 3 + 1 = 3axy, with neutral element at infinity, is represented as (X : Y : Z) satisfying X 3 + Y 3 + Z 3 = 3aXY Z. Here (X : Y : Z) = (λX : λY : λZ) for all nonzero λ.
• Doubling-oriented Doche/Icart/Kohel: A point (x, y) on an elliptic curve y 2 = x 3 + ax 2 + 16ax, with neutral element at infinity, is represented as (X : Y : Z :
2 ) for all nonzero λ.
• Tripling-oriented Doche/Icart/Kohel: A point (x, y) on an elliptic curve y 2 = x 3 + 3a(x + 1) 2 , with neutral element at infinity, is represented as (X : Y : Z :
• Edwards (with c = 1): A point (x, y) on an elliptic curve x 2 + y 2 = 1 + dx 2 y 2 , with neutral element (0, 1), is represented as (X :
Here (X : Y : Z) = (λX : λY : λZ) for all nonzero λ.
We copied formulas from several sources in the literature; see [24] for an overview. One particularly noteworthy source is the 1986 paper [16] by Chudnovsky and Chudnovsky, containing formulas and operation counts for several forms of elliptic curves: projective, Jacobian, Jacobi quartic, Jacobi intersection, and Hessian. Liardet and Smart in [34] presented faster algorithms for Jacobi intersections. Billet and Joye in [9] presented faster algorithms for Jacobi quartics. Joye and Quisquater in [28] pointed out that the Hessian addition formulas (dating back to Sylvester) could also be used for doublings after a permutation of input coordinates, providing a weak form of unification: specifically, 2(X 1 :
. Brier and Joye in [13] presented unified addition formulas for projective (and affine) coordinates; see also [12] . Of course, we also include our own algorithms for Edwards curves.
Chudnovsky and Chudnovsky also pointed out, in the case of Jacobian coordinates, that readdition of a point is less expensive than the first addition. The addition formulas for (X 1 : . But this representation is wasteful, as pointed out by Cohen, Miyaji, and Ono in [18] : if (X 1 : Y 1 : Z 1 ) is used only for a doubling and not for a general addition then there is no need to compute Z 3 1 . Sometimes coordinates (X : Y : Z : Z 2 : Z 3 ) are called "Chudnovsky coordinates" or "Chudnovsky-Jacobian coordinates," and computing Z 2 and Z 3 only when they are needed is called "mixing Chudnovsky coordinates with Jacobian coordinates." We prefer to describe the same speedup using the simpler concept of readditions.)
Our operation counts for previous systems are often better than the operation counts reported in the literature. One reason is that a multiplication can often be replaced with a squaring, saving M − S. For example, as pointed out in [5, pages 16-17] , Jacobian doubling with a = −3 uses 3M + 5S rather than the usual 4M + 4S. As another example, Doche/Icart/Kohel doubling uses 2M + 5S + 2D rather than 3M + 4S + 2D. The Explicit-Formulas Database contains full justification for each of our operation counts. Most of the addition formulas in this last table are strongly unified : they work without change for doublings. The Hessian addition algorithm is an exception: it works for doublings only after a permutation of input coordinates. As mentioned earlier, the addition algorithm for Edwards curves with non-square d has the stronger feature of being complete: it works without change for all inputs.
Single-scalar variable-point multiplication
This section compares Edwards curves to previous curve forms for single-scalar variable-point multiplication: computing nP given an integer n and a curve point P . This is one of the critical computations in elliptic-curve cryptography; for example, if n is a secret key and P is another user's public key then nP is a Diffie-Hellman secret shared between the two users. The next section considers variations of the same problem: fixed points P (allowing precomputation of, e.g., 2 128 P ), more scalars and points, etc. See [2] and [22] for surveys of the classic algorithms for scalar multiplication. We focus on "signed sliding window" algorithms, specifically with "window width 1" (also known as "non-adjacent form" or "NAF") or "window width 4." We also discuss the "Montgomery ladder."
We make the standard assumption that the input point P has Z = 1. All additions of P can thus be computed as mixed additions. By scaling other points to have Z = 1 one can create more mixed additions at the expense of extra field inversions; for the sake of simplicity we ignore this option in our comparison.
The NAF algorithm, for an average b-bit scalar n, uses approximately b doublings and approximately (1/3)b mixed additions. So we tally the cost of 1 doubling and 1/3 mixed additions: The "signed width-4 sliding windows" algorithm involves, on average, approximately b − 4. Another approach to high-speed single-scalar multiplication is Montgomery's algorithm in [38] for x-coordinate operations on curves in Montgomery form y 2 = x 3 + ax 2 + x. This algorithm does not support fast addition P, Q → P + Q, does not support arbitrary addition chains, and does not fit into our previous tables; but it does support fast "differential addition" P − Q, P, Q → P + Q, and therefore fast computation of "differential addition-subtraction chains." In particular, the "Montgomery ladder" uses 5M + 4S + 1D per bit of n to compute P → nP . For comparison, the NAF algorithm for Edwards curves with our formulas takes 6M + 4.33S + 0.333D per bit of n, clearly slower than 5M + 4S + 1D per bit. But signed width-4 sliding windows take only 4.86M + 4.12S + 0.194D per bit for b = 256, saving 0.14M − 0.12S + 0.806D per bit. Note that Edwards form is less sensitive to a large D than Montgomery form. Larger b's favor larger window widths, reducing the number of additions per bit and making Edwards curves even more attractive.
7 Multiple scalars, fixed points, etc.
General multi-scalar multiplication means computing n i P i given integers n i and curve points P i . Specific tasks are obtained by specifying the number of points, by specifying which points are known in advance, by specifying which integers are known in advance, etc. See generally [2] and [22] .
We focus on four specific algorithms: the popular "joint sparse form" ("JSF") algorithm for computing n 1 P 1 +n 2 P 2 , given b-bit integers n 1 , n 2 and curve points P 1 , P 2 ; the accelerated ECDSA verification algorithm in [1, page 9] ; batch verification of elliptic-curve signatures, using the "Small Exponents Test" from [4, §3.3] and the multi-scalar multiplication algorithm that de Rooij in [20, §4] credits to Bos and Coster; and computation of nP for a fixed point P , using a standard "comb" table containing 90 precomputed multiples of P , essentially 2 {0,1,2,3,4,5}b/6 ({0, 1}P +{0, 1}2 b/24 P +{0, 1}2 2b/24 P +{0, 1}2 3b/24 P ), normalized to have Z = 1.
The JSF algorithm uses about b doublings, about (1/4)b mixed additions (for average n 1 , n 2 ), and about (1/4)b readditions. So we tally the cost of 1 doubling, 1/4 mixed additions, and 1/4 readditions: The batch-verification algorithm is not as well known as it should be, so we summarize it here for one variant of the ElGamal signature system. Fix a hash function H and a base point B on an elliptic curve over a 256-bit field. Define (R, s) as a signature of a message m under a public key K if R, K are curve points, s is a 256-bit integer, and sB = H(R, m)R + K. The batch-verification algorithm is given (e.g.) 100 alleged signatures (R i , s i ) of 100 messages m i under 100 keys K i . The algorithm checks the equations s i B = H(R i , m i )R i + K i by choosing random 128-bit integers v i and checking that the Montgomery's x-coordinate algorithm in [38] can also be used for multiscalar multiplication, but does not seem to provide competitive performance as the number of scalars increases, despite recent differential-addition-chain improvements in [6] and [14] .
Countermeasures against side-channel attacks
The scalar-multiplication algorithms discussed in §6 and §7 are often unacceptable for cryptographic hardware and embedded systems. Many secret bits of the integers n i are leaked, through the pattern of doublings and mixed additions and non-mixed additions, to side-channel attacks such as simple power analysis. See generally [27] , [33] , and [36] .
One response is to use a fixed pattern of doublings, mixed additions, etc., independent of the integers n i . Another response is to hide the pattern of doublings, mixed additions, etc. Some of these responses still leak the Hamming weight in the single-scalar case, and the total number of operations in the general case, but this information can be shielded at low cost in other ways. Of course, at a lower level, field operations must be individually shielded. In particular, an operation counted as M must be carried out by a multiplication unit whose time, power consumption, etc. do not depend on the inputs. Even if the inputs happen to be the same, and even if a faster squaring unit is available, the multiplication must not be carried out by the squaring unit. An operation counted as S can be carried out by a faster squaring unit whose time, power consumption, etc. do not depend on the input.
We focus on four specific side-channel countermeasures: non-sliding windows with digits {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}; signed width-4 sliding windows with unified addition-or-doubling formulas; width-4 sliding windows with atomic blocks; and the Montgomery ladder. For concreteness we consider two examples of primitives: first single-scalar multiplication and then triple-scalar multiplication. Extra scalars produce extra additions, reducing the importance of doublings, as in §7; in particular, extra scalars make unified formulas more attractive.
We also discuss differential attacks at the end of the section.
Single-scalar multiplication. Next we consider signed width-4 sliding windows with atomic blocks. In [15] , Chevallier-Mames, Ciet, and Joye presented Jacobian-coordinate formulas using 10 atomic blocks for doubling and 16 atomic blocks for addition. Each block costs 1M and consists of one field multiplication, one field addition, one field negation, and another field addition; many of the additions and negations are dummy operations. Barbosa and Page in [3] presented automatic tools that turn arbitrary explicit formulas using mM + sS into formulas using m + s atomic blocks, each consisting of one field multiplication and some number of field additions and negations, thus costing 1M. So we tally the cost of 0.98 doublings, 0.17 readditions, 0.025 mixed additions, and 0.0035 non-mixed additions, as in §6, except that we insist on S = M: The Montgomery ladder for single-scalar multiplication naturally uses a fixed double-add pattern costing only 5M+4S+1D per bit. This combination of sidechannel resistance and high speed has already attracted interest; see, e.g., [13, §4] , [29] , and [7] .
We comment that, in some situations, the dummy operations in atomic blocks can be detected by fault attacks. Non-sliding windows (with nonzero digits), unified formulas, and the Montgomery ladder have the virtue of avoiding dummy operations.
Triple-scalar multiplication. Non-sliding windows with digits {1, 2, 3 The Montgomery ladder can be generalized to a multi-scalar multiplication method using a fixed pattern of doublings and additions, as discussed in [6] and [14] , but the performance of the generalization degrades rapidly as the number of scalars increases, as mentioned in §7.
Countermeasures against differential and correlation side-channel attacks. Curves in Edwards form are compatible with countermeasures against differential and correlation side-channel attacks:
• Randomized representations of scalars as addition-subtraction chains; see, e.g., [42] and [34, §4] . Our point representation supports arbitrary additions and subtractions.
• Randomized scalars; see, e.g., [19, §5.1].
• Randomized coordinates; see, e.g., [19, §5.3] . Our point representation is redundant and can be scaled freely: (X 1 : Y 1 : Z 1 ) = (λX 1 : λY 1 : λZ 1 ) for any λ = 0.
• Randomized points, for example computing nP as n(P + Q) − nQ; see, e.g., [19, §5.2] . Our point representation supports arbitrary additions and subtractions.
• Randomized curves; see, e.g., [33, §29.2] . Using the generalized addition law involving c and d one can easily transfer the computation to an isomorphic curve withc andd satisfying dc 4 =dc 4 . As another example, one can perform computations on a 3-isogenous curve.
We suggest using a combination of these countermeasures. In particular, point randomization or scalar randomization appears to be vital to counteract Goubintype attacks.
Curves in Edwards form are also compatible with countermeasures to other types of attacks discussed in [36] .
